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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY WITH
ANNOTATIONS TO THE INDIANA DECISIONS*
Topic 4.

Liabilities

Section 100. EFFECT OF RATIFICATION; IN GENERAL.
Except as stated in § 101, the liabilities resulting from
ratification are the same as those resulting from authorization
if, between the time when the original act was performed and
when it was affirmed, there has been no change in the capacity
of the principal or third person or in the legality of authorizing
or performing the original act.
Comment:
a. The affirmance of the act of an unauthorized person
by the purported principal, all conditions requisite for ratification being fulfilled, normally has the same effect as if such
person had been originally authorized. There are a number
of situations, however, where an affirmance results only in
a ratification which the principal or the third person may
avoid, Thus, as stated in § 91, a purported principal may
rescind an affirmance made in ignorance of a material fact,
with the consequence that no ratification finally results. Also, the third person may elect to avoid an affirmance made
under conditions which would render it inequitable to bind
him by it (see § 89) or an affirmance which results only from
conduct of the purported principal inconsistent with a repudiation of the transaction by him (see §§ 97-99).
b. Persons affected. The effect of ratification upon the
liabilities of the parties to the transaction is stated in subsequent Sections. The liabilities of the principal to the third
person in the transaction are stated in §§ 143, 218, 290; of
the third person to the principal in § 319; of the agent to
the principal in §§ 408, 416; of the principal to the agent
in § 462; of the agent to the third person in §§ 338, 360.
*Continued from January, 1936, issue and to be continued in subsequent issues.
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Except as to interests acquired between the time of the
transaction and the time of the affirmance (see § 101), persons not parties to the transaction are affected as if the transaction had been originally authorized, subject to the conditions as to capacity and legality stated in this Section.
*

*

*

c. Misrepresentationand duress. The effect of misrepresentation or duress by the third person in the original transaction is the same after an affirmance without knowledge of
the fraud or duress as if the transaction had been authorized; the effect of misrepresentation or duress in obtaining
the affirmance is the same as if an authorization had been
similarly obtained. Thus, the principal can rescind a contract the making of which he has ratified, if it is obtained
through a misrepresentation by the third person of an important collateral fact which affects the judgment of the agent
or principal; if such fact is material within the meaning of
§ 91, the principal can avoid the affirmance because of ignorance of fact at the time of the affirmance. If the third
person obtains the affirmance by misrepresentation or duress,
the principal can avoid it, as he could an authorization so
obtained. In either case, the principal has an election to
maintain an action against the third person for the deceit or
the duress.
If the agent makes misrepresentations to the third person
other than as to his power to bind the principal, and this is
known to the principal when he affirms, he is affected by the
affirmance as if he had authorized the transaction with
knowledge that the agent would make untruthful statements.
If he is not aware of the statements of the agent, he may disaffirm upon learning the facts. Misrepresentation by the
agent as to his power to bind the principal does not prevent
the affirmance of the transaction from operating as ratification, and neither the principal nor the agent is liable there-
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after to the third person for such misrepresentation. If the
agent obtains an affirmance by making misrepresentations
to the principal, the liabilities of the parties are the same as
if the agent had obtained an authorization by means of
similar misrepresentations, except that if misrepresentations
made in obtaining affirmance prevent the principal from
knowing the material facts of the prior transaction, the principal may disaffirm in accordance with the rule stated in § 91.
*

*

*

d. Incapacity. If, at the time of the original transaction,
the purported principal had only partial capacity so that he
could have avoided the appointment of an agent to perform
the transaction, an affirmance while such partial incapacity
remains is subject to the same power of avoidance. If, however, the partial incapacity has ceased at the time of the affirmance, the principal can affirm the conduct of the purported agent so that the relationship between himself and
the purported agent becomes the same as if the agent had
been originally authorized, and the principal thereby becomes a party to the transaction, retaining the power of
avoidance. In addition, he may also affirm the transaction as
a whole, in which case the relations between himself and
the third person are the same as if he had been originally
competent to bind himself in the transaction. An affirmance
not indicating that it is limited to the act of the pirported
agent is interpreted as an affirmance of the transaction as
well as of the appointment. As stated in Comment b on §
84, if, at the time of the original transaction, the purported
principal had no capacity to appoint an agent or to enter
into the transaction, an affirmance after the disability is
removed is ineffective.
If, at the time of the original transaction, the purported
principal had full capacity, but he affirms at a time when
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his capacity is such that he could avoid an authorization or
a transaction then authorized by him, he may avoid the affirmance or the transction.

e. Change of law. If, at the time of the original transaction, the appointment of the agent could have been avoided by the purported principal, or the transaction could have
been avoided by him or by the third person because of illegality, the appointment or the transaction is equally subject to avoidance after an affirmance made without change.
of conditions. If, had the agent been authorized, his appointment or the transaction conducted by him would have
been unlawful, and hence could have been avoided by the
purported principal or by the third person, the transaction
may be similarly avoided after affirmance, although the affirmance takes place when such an appointment or transaction would be lawful, in the absence of retroactive legislation. If, at the time of the original transaction, such an appointment or transaction would have had no legal effect, the
affirmance is inoperative (see § 84); if, at the time of the
affirmance, such an appointment or transaction would have
no legal effect, the affirmance is inoperative except where the
original transaction was lawful and it is not against public
policy at the time of affirmance to enforce rights arising
from it (see § 86).
Annotation:
Ratification dates back and supplies original want of authority. Wilson & Co.
v. Mississippi Box Co., 76 Ind. App. 103, 130 N. E. 127 (1921); Hale v. Hale,
74 Ind. App. 405, 126 N. E. 692 (1920); Public SavinGs Insurance Co. v. Greenoald, 68 Ind. App. 609, 118 N. E. 556 (1918): National Life Ins. Co. v. Headrick,
63 Ind. App. 54, 112 N. E. 559 (1916); Welker v. Appelman. 44 Ind. App. 699,
90 N. E. 35 (1909); United States Express Co. v. Rawson. 106 Ind. 215, 6 N. E.
337 (1886); Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Berning, 37 Ind. App. 109, 76 N. E. 776
(1906); Minnich v. Darling, 8 Ind. App. 539, 36 N. E. 173 (1894); Persons v.
MeKibben, 9 Ind. 261, 61 Am. Dec. 85 (1854); Elliott v. Armstrongi 2 Blackf. 198
(1829).
No Indiana cases have been found involving change of capadty of the principal or third person or in the legality of authorizing or performing the original act.
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Section 101. EXCEPTIONS TO NORMAL EFFECT or RATIFICATION.
Ratification is not effective:
(a) in favor of a person who, by misrepresentation or duress, has caused the affirmance;
(b) in favor of the agent against the principal if the principal is obliged to affirm in order to protect his own interests; or
(c) in diminution of the rights or other interests of persons
not parties to the transaction which were acquired in
the subject matter before affirmance.
Comment on Clause (a):
a. The effect of fraud or duress in the original transaction by the purported agent or by the other party to the
contract is stated in Comment c on § 100. Other persons
who acquire rights as a result of a ratification which they
have obtained by misrepresentation or duress cannot enforce
such rights against the defrauded or coerced person.

Comment on Clause (b):
b. The liabilities of the principal to the agent and of the
agent to the principal which result from ratification are
stated in §§ 408, 416, 462.
Comment on Clause (c):
c. The rule by which ratification has the effect of authorization does not operate to destroy rights which have been
created between the time of the original act and the affirmance, except the right of the third person to maintain an action against the purported agent because of his lack of authority. Where the other party to the transaction acquires
rights, his change of position gives him an election to avoid
the affirmance; where the rights have been acquired by other
persons, an affirmance resulting in ratification is subject to
such rights.
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Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this

section.
Section 102.

REVOCABILITY OF RATrFICATION.

An affirmance not voidable for fraud, duress, illegality, or
lack of capacity, and which cannot be avoided by the principal
for lack of knowledge, or by the third person because of a
change of position or other similar cause, is not affected by the
subsequent attempted withdrawal of either party; an agreement between the principal and the third person to rescind
the affirmance does not affect the rights of the agent, and such
an agreement between the principal and agent does not affect
the rights of the third person.
Comment:
a. An affirmance may result in a ratification which is voidable-at the election of the principal (see § 91); or of the
third person (see §§ 89, 90, 95, 98, 99). Except as to such
avoidance, an affirmance resulting in ratification binds all
parties; neither the principal nor the third person can, by
a unilateral act, withdraw from the transaction, irrespective
of whether or not, subsequent to the affirmance, there has
been a change of position by the other.
An agreement between the principal and the third person
to rescind a ratification operates as would an agreement to
rescind a contract made by the authorized conduct of the
agent. Such rescission does not make the agent liable to the
third person, nor does it diminish his right, if any, to compensation from the principal. Likewise, an agreement between the principal and agent, whether before or after a
manifestation to the third person, to rescind an affirmance
already made does not affect the position of the third person.

b. Persons whose rights have accrued between the time
of the ratification and the time of its rescission are not affected by a rescission even though this has been agreed to
by the principal, agent, and third person.
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Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 103. ESTOPPEL To DENY RATIFICATION.
A person who untruthfully manifests to a third person that
an act purported to be done on his account was authorized or
ratified in a manner sufficient for authorization or ratification,
or that an act done by another who impersonates him was done
by him, knowing or having reason to know that the third
person is likely to act in reliance upon such manifestation, is
subject to liability as if such act were authorized or ratified
or had been done by him, if the third person so changes his
position in reasonable reliance upon such manifestation that it
would be inequitable not to impose such liability.

Comment:
a. The manifestation may be that one who purported to
act as agent but who was without power to bind the principal
was authorized, or that his act was ratified. Ordinarily, such
a manifestation results in ratification (see § 93). Under some
circumstances, however, ratification may be impossible, as

where the purported principal had no capacity to contract
at the time when a contract was purported to be made for
him; in such case a statement by him, at a time when he
could authorize such a contract, that he was competent when
the original act was done brings him within the rule stated
in this Section, if the third person changes his position in reliance thereon. Likewise, the purported principal may not
have made the manifestation in the required form, where a
formality is necessary; in this case a representation that the
required form was used subjects him to liability as if there
were ratification, to a person who changes his position in
reasonable reliance upon the statement.

b. A person, such as a forger, may deceive another into
the belief that he, the forger, is a different person or that
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an act which he has done is the act of a different person.
In such cases there is no purporting to act for another and
hence the one whose act or person is simulated cannot ratify
(see § 85); if, however, he assists in misleading the deceived person and such person changes his position in reasonable reliance upon the situation as he believes it to be,
he.-may be bound under the rule stated in this Section.

c. The manifestation may be by affirmative conduct, as
a statement to the third person, or it may consist of ,a failure to act. If a person knows or has reason to know that another has purported to be his agent or has simulated him
or his act, or that a third person has been deceived thereby
and is likely to act upon his erroneous belief, he must take
such steps to correct the misinformation as would be taken
by a reasonable person having ordinary regard for the interests of others if he is to avoid liability. If he fails to undeceive the third person, he becomes subject to liability to
him as if the facts were as believed by him to be, provided
that the deceived person changes his position in reasonable
reliance upon their truth.

d. It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this
Subject to state specifically the rules which determine whether or not there has been such a change of position that it is
equitable to impose liability in accordance with the rule
stated in this Section. The general principles of equitable
estoppel are applicable.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with an estoppel to deny a ratification.
The cases Barnett v. Gluting, 3 Ind. App. 415, 29 N. E. 927 (1891), and
Growcocke v. Hall, 82 Ind. 202 (1882), deal with the related problem of estoppel
to deny agency or master and seryant relationship, when these relationships have
been represented as existing.
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Section 104.

LIABILITY

BECAUSE

OF

ADOPTION,

NOVATION,

OR

QUASI CONTRACT.

Although there is no ratification, a person on whose account
another acts or purports to act may become a party to a trans-

action similar to the original transaction by manifesting consent, or he may become subject to liability for the value of
benefits received as a result of the original transaction.

Comment:
a. The fact that, because of the rules stated in §§ 82-99,
a person for whom another acted or purported to act does
not or cannot ratify, does not necessarily mean that he does
not have rights and duties which are the same or similar to
those which he would have had if there had been ratification.
Comments b, c and d on the present Section state some of
the situations in which such rights or duties arise.
b. Adoption. An affirmance of a contract by one on
whose account it was purported to be made but which does
not result in ratification, as where at the time of the transaction the purported principal was incapable of contracting,
often results in a new contract between the parties at the
time of or subsequent to the time of affirmance. If the third
person knew the facts at the time of the original transaction,
the purported contract may operate as an offer from him
which becomes a contract when accepted by the purported
principal. If the third person did not know that the original
transaction was ineffective, the new contract becomes complete, in the terms of the original transaction except as to
date, when the parties thereto consent. This consent may
be manifested by their acquiescence or by other conduct indicating that they intend to accept the conditions of the
transaction as originally entered into. As in the formation
of other contracts, there must be consideration.
c. Novation. A person intending to act for another but
without power to bind him may, inadvertently or otherwise,
contract without disclosure that he intends to act as agent.
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Upon discovery of the facts and the willingness of the intended principal to become a party to the transaction, the
other party to the contract may accept him as a party thereto, either in addition to or in substitution for the person contracting. If he does so, the transaction is a contract made at
the time of such subsequent agreement.
*

*

*

d. Quasi contract. A person not subject to liability because of ratification may have received benefits from the
act of a purported agent under such conditions that it is inequitable for him not to pay a third person foi their value.
The liability in such cases is dependent upon the principles
of quasi contract.
*

*

*

Annotation:
In the following cases corporations which have subsequently adopted contracts made by promoters were held bound: Cushion Heel Shoe Co. v. Hartt, 181
Ind. 167, 103 N. E. 1063, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 797 (1914); Smith v. Parker,
148 Ind. 127, 45 N. E. 770 (1897) ; Bruner, Receiver, v. Brown, 139 Ind. 660, 38 N.
E. 318 (1894); Mt. Pleasant Coal Company v. Watts, 91 Ind. App. 501, 151 N. E.
7 (1926) ; Outing Kumfy-Kab Company v. Trey, 74 Ind. App. 286, 125 N. E. 234
(1919); Davis and Rankin Building, etc., v. Hillsboro Creamery Co., 10 Ind. App.
42, 37 N. E. 549 (1894).

Chalter 5
TERMINATION
Scope Note: This Chapter deals with the events which
terminate authority, apparent authority, and the powers
created in the form of an agency authority termed "powers
given as security." It does not specifically deal with the effect of the termination, although it is implicit that when the
agent's authority terminates he cannot rightfully make the
principal a party to a transaction, and if both authority and
apparent authority terminate he has no power to make the
principal a party. The liability of the agent to a third person
when his authority has terminated is stated in §§ 329-331.
The liability of the principal and agent to each other when
authority has terminated is stated in §§ 386, 450-456.
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Topic 1. Termination of Authority
TITLE A.

INFERRED FROM ORIGINAL MANIFESTATION IN
LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS

Section 105.

LAPSE OF TimE.

Authority conferred for a specific time terminates at the
expiration of that period; if no time is specified, authority
terminates at the end of a reasonable period.
Comment:
a. The time when authority is to terminate may be specified by reference to a particular day of the month or by
reference to an event, such as Easter, which is fixed in relation to the calendar. Termination upon the happening of
other events is dealt with in §§ 106-116.
Although authority to act -can be exercised only within
the time specified, an agent authorized to conduct a transaction before a certain time ordinarily would be authorized
thereafter to do incidental acts usual in connection with it
or required for its completion.

b. If no time is specified, what constitutes a reasonable
time during which the authority continues is determined by
the nature of the act specifically authorized, the formality of
the authorization, the likelihood of changes in the purposes
of the principal, and other factors. The time within which
it is reasonable for the agent to act is not necessarily the
same as that during which an offer to contract, unspecified
as to time, would continue. A reasonable time is not limited
to that in which the agent has had a reasonable opportunity
to act, nor to a time beyond which it would be unreasonable
for him to delay in acting; the agent has authority to act
if. in view of all the circumstances, it is reasonable for him
to believe that the principal still intends him to act. Authority may be kept alive beyond what otherwise would be a rea-
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sonable time by the fact that the principal knows that the
agent is continuing to make efforts to perform and acquiesces
therein.

Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 106.

ACCOMPLISHMENT OF AUTHORIZED ACT.

The authority of an agent to perform a specified act or to
accomplish a specified result terminates when the act is done
or the result is accomplished by the agent or by another, except that where the act is done or the result is accomplished
by a person other than the agent, the manifestations of the
principal to the agent determine whether the authority termi-

nates at once or when the agent has notice thereof.
Comment:
a. Where an agent has been authorized to perform a specified transaction, his authority terminates when he has completed the transaction; he does not, because of such previous
authority, have authority to deal further with the subject
matter. If the agent's authorization is less specific but he is
appointed to accomplish a particular result, such as the
draining of a swamp by whatever means he may select, his
authority terminates when the result is accomplished. See
§ 66 for the specific application of the rule stated in this
Section to the authority of a buying or selling agent.
Where authority is given in the alternative, the performance of one of the authorized acts terminates authority to
perform the other. Where the authority is given to do several
acts but the performance of one of them causes the performance of others to be contrary to the principal's interests of
which the agent has notice, his authority to act terminates.
The same rules apply where the result is accomplished by
a third person, subject to the requirement of notice to the
agent which exists in certain cases (see Comment c). The
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fact that the principal violates a contract with the agent in
so accomplishing the result by means other than the agent
does not prevent the agent's authority from terminating.

b. The inference that an agent's authority is limited to
the performance of an act or one of several acts, or to the
accomplishment of a particular result, may arise from specific terms in the principal's manifestation to the agent or
from the nature of the agent's employment and other relevant circumstances.

c. Accomplishment by another. Whether or not, when
the authorized act is done or the result accomplished by
some one other than the agent, his authority ceases at once
depends upon the previous or contemporary manifestations
of the principal, which control in spite of a contract to the
contrary (see § 118). The interpretation of these manifeatations in turn depends upon the circumstances known to both
parties. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is inferred that the agent's authority does not terminate until
the agent has notice of the accomplishment of the result.
The conditions of the employment, however, may indicate
that notice to the agent is not essential. The fact that the
agent is employed only for the one transaction, or that it is
agreed that his authority is not exclusive, indicates an agreement that his authority is to terminate without notice, as
also does the fact that he is, and the principal is not, likely
to know of the terminating event. On the other hand, the
fact that the agent is a general agent or that he is given exclusive authority to do the act or accomplish the result, or
that the principal has agreed not to act in person, or that the
terminating event is more likely to be known to the prin-
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cipal than to the agent, indicates that the authority is not to
terminate until the agent has notice.
d. Notice. The agent has notice of the terminating event
when he has knowledge, reason to know, or should know of
the terminating event, or has been given notification by the
principal (See § 134). Notice of facts which give him reason to believe that the principal's purpose, as expressed to
him, has been accomplished is notice that the purpose has
been accomplished.

e. Facts known by principalto be unknown to agent. If
the agent's authority is terminated by events 'which are
known to the principal and which he has reason to know are
unknown to the agent, the principal normally has a duty
of informing the agent within a reasonable time that his authority has terminated, if the principal has reason to believe
that the agent will continue to act for him in ignorafice of the
terminating event. Such information may be necessary to
prevent the agent from incurring additional expense, from
making unnecessary efforts, or from incurring liabilities because of entering into a transaction without power to consummate it. Thus, if the principal has authorized an agent
to contract for the sale of a house, it being agreed that a
sale by one other than the agent is to terminate the authority, and the principal himself sells the house, it would be the
normal understanding that he is to use care to notify the
agent of such sale; if the principal has this duty, he would be
subject to liability to the agent for damage caused by a
failure to use care in performing it.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Bragg

v. Bamberger, 23 Ind. 198 (1864); C. Callahan Co. v. Wall Rice Milling Co.,
44 Ind. App. 372, 89 N. E. 418 (1909); Kingan & Co. v. Silvers, 13 Ind. App 80,
37 N. E. 413 (1894).
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Section 107.

HAPPENING OF SPECIFIED EVENTS.

If the terms of the authorization specifically provide that an
authority is to continue until a specified event happens or during the continuance of a specified condition, whether the authority terminates at once upon the happening of the event
or the cessation of the condition or only when the agent has
notice of such happening or cessation depends upon the interpretation of the principal's manifestation in light of all circumstances.
Comment:
a. The principles stated in §§ 32-48 dealing with the interpretation of authority are applicable, especially § 45,
which deals with the effect of a mistake by the agent as to
the facts upon which his authority depends. The statements
in the Comment on § 106 with reference to termination by
the accomplishment of the specified act or purpose are also
applicable.

Annotation:
An agent with authority to bind a principal by accepting performance of a
contract before the happening of a specified event, has no authority to bind the
principal by acceptance of performance after the happening of that event. Longworth v. Conwell, 2 Blackf. 469 (1831).

Section 108.

HAPPENING OF UNSPECIFIED EVENTS OR CHANGES;
IN GENERAL.

(1) The authority of an agent terminates or is suspended
when the agent has notice of the happening of an event or a
change in conditions from which he should reasonably infer
that the principal does not consent to the further exercise of
authority or would not consent if he knew the facts.
(2) The agent's authority revives upon the restoration of
the original conditions within a reasonable time if the agent
has no notice that the principal's position has been changed.
Comment:
a. Although the authority of the agent terminates under
the conditions stated in this Section, his power to bind the
principal may not terminate, either because he continues to
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have apparent authority (see § 125), or because he has apparent ownership or other basis of a power to bind the principal.
Comment on Subsection (1):
b. Sections 109-116 are specific applications of the rules
stated in this Section; and the Comment and Illustrations
therein are applicable to this Section.
The rule stated in the present Section is applicable where
there is a change in the situation which the principal and
agent did not provide for, and as to which no limitation of
authority was expressed in the terms of the agreement constituting the authorization. The termination is effected in
accordance with terms which it may be inferred would have
been made if the principal had anticipated the situation.
Learning of conditions existing at the time of the authorization but then unknown to the principal or agent has the same
effect as learning of a change of conditions.
If the agent has notice that the principal, when conferring
authority, had the possibility of a change of conditions in
mind and did not limit the authorization, the authority continues despite the change. Likewise, a change in conditions
does not terminate the agent's authority if the directions of
the principal are peremptory, the principal manifesting that
the agent is to act under any conditions which might eventuate.
If, from the facts of which the agent has notice, he should
realize beyond doubt that the principal would not wish him
to act, the authority terminates, although in fact the principal knows the facts and is willing that the agent should
continue to act, and although the action by the agent proves
beneficial to the principal. In such cases the consent of the
principal to the agent's act ordinarily would be a ratification
of it.
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c. Notice. The agent has notice of the change in conditions when he knows of it, has reason to know, or should
know of it, irrespective of the source of his information. He
also has notice if he is given notification of the change by the
principal or by another agent of the principal, although he
does not then become aware of the facts (see §§ 9-11 which
state the rules applicable to notice, knowledge, and notification).
*

*

*

d. Authority to do several acts. Authority to perform a
number of different acts may terminate as to some of them
but not as to others. If, however, the proper performance of
one of the acts is dependent upon the performance of another, authority to perform the first terminates with the
termination of authority to perform the second.
*

*

*

e. Where agent in doubt. The change in conditions may
be such that the agent is reasonably in doubt as to whether
or not the principal would further consent to the exercise of
authority. In such case, he is authorized to act unless it is
reasonably clear that the principal would not desire him to
do so. If he acts reasonably in the belief that the principal
wishes his authority to continue under the conditions, his
conduct is authorized although he does something which is
contrary to what the principal in fact wishes. If he should
realize that the principal may be in doubt as to whether he
has or has not exercised his authority, he may have a duty
to communicate the facts as to its exercise to the principal
at once (see § 381). Where the principal and agent are in
close communication with each other, as where the agent is
a servant meeting the principal daily, and a change occurs
which might affect the performance of the authority and of
which, as the agent knows, the principal is aware, the agent
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may properly assume that the principal will give new directions if he desires the agent not to act as originally contemplated and that, if new directions are not given, the authority is to be executed in accordance with the original orders.

Comment on Subsection (2):

f. The agent is privileged to exercise authority when, and
only when, he has reason to believe the principal wishes it to
be exercised. Conditions may change from day to day in
such a way that authority is suspended, reviving later. Although the change in conditions is apparently permanent,
yet if the situation again changes and the original conditions
are restored, and if the agent has no notice that the prin-'
cipal's conduct has been affected by the temporary change,
his authority to act revives. If it is doubtful whether or not
the principal has changed his position in reliance upon the
change in conditions, the agent may have a duty of ascertaining the facts before acting.

Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 109. CHANGE IN VALUE OR BUSINESS CONDITIONS.
The authority of an agent terminates or is suspended when
he has notice of a change in value of the subject matter or a
change in business conditions from which he should infer that
the principal, if he knew of it, would not consent to the further
exercise of the authority.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. Where conditions unexpectedly change so that it becomes obviously poor business policy for a selling agent or a
purchasing agent to act for the principal, the agent's author-
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ity ordinarily terminates or is suspended unless his orders
are so peremptory that he should reasonably believe that the
principal intends him to act in spite of the change. Thus, authority resulting from a direction to sell at the market price
goods which it is possible for the agent to retain for a time
may be suspended by temporary local conditions which make
it impossible to obtain a satisfactory price.
c. A business agent is subject to a duty to the principal
to use care and skill in ascertaining business conditions, and
he is not authorized to do the directed act, unless his orders
are peremptory, if he reasonably should realize in light of
facts which he would ascertain by the use of the skill which
he has or purports to have that the principal would not desire him to act if the facts were known.
*

*

*

Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 110.

Loss

OR DESTRUCTION OF SUBJECT MATTER.

Unless otherwise agreed, the loss or destruction of the subject matter of the authority or the termination of the principal's interest therein terminates the agent's authority to deal
with reference thereto, either at once/or when the agent has
notice thereof, dependent upon the manifestation of the principal to the agent.

Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. If the act authorized is a physical dealing with the subject matter, its loss or destruction makes it impossible for
the agent to execute the authority. If the act authorized is a
dealing with the interests of the principal in it, the agent may
still, however, be authorized to make the principal a party
to a contract relating thereto, although the physical subject
matter or the principal's interests therein are gone. In the
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absence of a manifestation to the contrary, however, it is
inferred that where a principal authorizes an agent to sell
something, the agent's authority to act for the principal with
respect to it terminates when the subject matter or the principal's interests therein cease to exist, or when the agent has
notice thereof.
c. When notice necessary. It may be agreed that the
loss, destruction, or conveyance of the subject matter is to
terminate the authority of the agent upon its happening or
only when the agent has notice thereof. If the principal intentionally destroys or conveys the subject matter, his act
amounts to a revocation and ordinarily the agent's authority to bind the principal by a contract with respect thereto
does not terminate until the agent has received notice thereof. If, however, it is understood that the principal may compete with the agent by selling the subject matter, in person or through another agent, it may be the agreement that
the authority of the agent is terminated at once upon the
sale of the principal even before the agent has notice (see
Comment c on § 106).
d. Partialloss. The partial loss, destruction, or conveyance of the subject matter, if of such importance that the
agent should realize that the principal's original purposes
will no longer be served by dealing with the remainder, terminates the agent's authority to deal with the remainder.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the dictum in Rowe v. Rand,
111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 377 (1887).

Section 111.

LOSS OF QUALIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL OR AGENT.

The loss of or failure to acquire a qualification by the agent
without which it is illegal to do an authorized act, or a similar
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loss or failure by the principal, of which the agent has notice,
terminates the agent's authority to act if thereafter he should
infer that the principal, if he knew the facts, would not con-

sent to the further exercise of the authority.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. As stated in Comment e on § 34 it is ordinarily inferred
that a principal does not intend an agent to do an illegal act;
hence when an act, authorized when legal, becomes illegal
because of a loss or failure to acquire a needed qualification
by either principal or agent, ordinarily an agent with notice
of the facts should infer that the principal does not wish
him to continue to act. This is true even though the one not
having the qualification is liable to the other for failing to
have it.
c. When authority continues. The agent is authorized to
act in spite of a lack of qualification by himself or by the
principal, if he reasonably believes that the principal intends
him to act in spite of such lack, as where, at the time of the
authorization, it is known that the qualification will not be
acquired or will be lost. Likewise, where the lack of the qualification does not affect the transaction itself, but merely
imposes a penalty upon the agent for acting without it, the
circumstances would frequently indicate that the principal
wishes the agent to continue to act.

d. Assumption of qualification by principal. If a change
of law requires the principal to have a qualification not previously required, such as a license, the agent may ordinarily
assume that the principal will obtain it, unless he should
know that the principal cannot.
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the dictum in Rowe v. Rand,
II1 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 337 (1887).
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Section 112.

DISLOYALTY OF AGENT.

Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent termi-

nates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach
of loyalty to the principal.

Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable as far as it is pertinent.
b. Agents are appointed to forward the principal's interests, and when the agent ceases to do this and prefers his
own or another's interests, ordinarily the principal no longer
would desire the agent to act for him, and this the agent
should realize. Whether or not the disloyalty of the agent is
such that he should realize that the principal would desire
the termination of his entire authority at once is a question
of fact. Where the agent acquires an interest adverse to that
of the principal or acts for another principal, and this is not
known to the principal, ordinarily he should realize that the
principal would not desire him to continue to act, although
he does exactly what he would have done otherwise. Sections
387-409 state the duties of loyalty of an agent and the consequences of the breach of such duties as between the principal and the agent.

c. Liability to third persons. If, after being so disloyal
that his authority to act is terminated, the agent deals with
a third person on account of the principal, the power of the
agent to make the principal a party to the transaction is not
affected (see §§ 165, 171), unless the third person has notice of the facts (see § 166), or unless the agent acts for
another principal in the transadtion, in wfich event the
transaction is voidable by either principal (see § 313).
*

*

*f
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Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 113.

BANKRUPTCY OF AGENT.

The bankruptcy or insolvency of an agent terminates his
authority to conduct transactions in which the state of his
credit would so affect the interests of the principal that theagent should infer that the principal, if he knew the facts,
would not consent to the further exercise of the authority.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. Ordinarily, the bankruptcy or insolvency of an agent is
not of importance to the principal, and even where it is of
some importance, ordinarily it would not be of such great
importance as to prevent the agent from dealing with third
persons or completing transactions which he has been authorized to conduct for the principal. The principal's credit
or standing may, however, be affected by the credit of the
agent, and in cases where this is so the agent's authority to
act may terminate with the impairment of his credit. Likewise, in cases where the agent, having acted for the principal in the collection of money for the principal, would be
normally authorized to mix the proceeds with his own money
and to become a debtor for the whole amount, the agent, although authorized to collect, would not be authorized so to
become a debtor in view of his supervening insolvency.

Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. First
National Bank of Crown Point v. First National Bank of Richmond, 76 Ind. 561,
40 Am. Rep. 261 (1881).

Section 114. BANKRUPTCY OF PRINCIPAL.
The bankruptcy or the substantial impairment of the assets
of the principal, of which the agent has notice, terminates his
authority as to transactions which he should infer the principal no longer consents to have conducted for him.
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Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. An agent appointed to conduct business transactions
for the principal should realize that an unanticipated disaster to the principal's business is likely to cause the principal
to be unwilling to undertake many previously authorized
transactions. If there is reasonable doubt as to this, the agent
should communicate with the principal.
*

*

*

c. Upon the bankruptcy of the principal, most of his assets pass to the trustee in bankruptcy and the power of -the-.
agent to deal with these terminates at once irrespective of
notice, under the rule stated in § 124; the agent's authority
to bind the principal personally, however, is terminated only
if he should know of the bankruptcy or has been given a
notification by the principal.
*

*

*

Annotation:
There is a dictum in Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 337 (1887), to the
effect that bankruptcy of the principal terminates the authority of the agent.

Section 115.

WAR.

The outbreak of a war of which the agent has notice terminates his authority if the conditions are thereby so changed
that he should infer that the principal, if he knew the facts,
would not consent to the further exercise of the authority.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. The outbreak of war may be an event which causes
the execution of the agent's authority to be illegal (see §
116) or, where the war is not between the respective countries of the principal and agent, it may be one which merely causes the transaction originally authorized to be hazardous or impracticable.
*

*

*

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

c. Authority continues or revives. If the authority has
been conferred in contemplation of war or if the agent has
reason to believe that the principal contemplated war as a
contingency and did not specify that the agency should terminate upon its occurrence, the authority does not thereby
terminate, even though it becomes illegal to execute it. If the
outbreak of war does not cause the authorized act to be
unlawful and the conditions of performance are not substantially changed, the authority is not affected. Likewise,
although the authority may have been suspended during the
period of a short war, it may be revived upon its termination,
if the agent has no notice that the war has substantially affected the conditions under which he was authorized.

d. Notice. Ordinarily, the agent is charged with knowledge of the outbreak of war, either civil or foreign, in a
country in which he resides. Where he is authorized to send
goods to another country in which there is an outbreak of
war, he has notice of such war, although in fact ignorant of
it, if it is so notorious that persons in the careful performance of their business would learn of it.

e. The outbreak of war may cause the authorization or
the transaction which the agent was authorized to perform
to be entirely ineffective, in which case the rule stated in
§ 124 is applicable.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 116.

CHANGE OF LAW.

A change of law of which the agent has notice and which
causes the execution of his authority to be illegal, or which

otherwise materially changes the effect of its execution, termi-

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

nates his authority, if he should infer that the principal, if he
knew the facts, would not consent to the further exercise of
the authority.
Comment:
a. The Comment on § 108 is applicable.
b. The change of law may be such that an execution of
the agent's authority would give the principal no rights or
other interests, or it may be such that its execution would be
criminal or tortious. In either case, unless the agent has reason to believe that the authorization was given in contemplation of such a change, the agent should ordinarily reasonably believe that the principal no longer wishes to have him
act. The change in law may be one which makes the performance by the principal more onerous, as where a statute
is enacted which requires buildings, for the construction of
which the agent is authorized to contract, to be made of fireproof materials.

c. Authority to do several acts. Where the agent is authorized to do a series of acts and a change of law causes
one or more of them to become illegal, the authority to do
the remainder terminates if, but only if, the acts made illegal
are acts upon the performance of which the accomplishment
of the principal's purposes with respect to the remaining acts
depends.
*

*

*

d. Source of illegality. The change of law making the
execution of the authority illegal may result from a statute
which requires the principal or agent to have a specified
qualification which he does not have (see § 111).
e. Notice. An agent has notice of a change of law when
he knows of it, or is given a notification of it, or when he
would acquire knowledge of it in the performance of his
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duties to the principal, using ordinary care and skill or that
which he has or professes to have. It may be agreed between
the principal and agent that his authority terminates upon
a change of law without notice to him.
f. A change in law may cause the authorization, or a transaction which the agent was authorized to perform, to be entirely ineffective, in which case the rule stated in § 124 is
applicable.
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

TITLE B. TERMINATION BY MUTUAL CONSENT,
REVOCATION, OR RENUNCIATION

Section 117. MUTUAL CONSENT.
The authority of an agent teminates in accordance with
the terms of an agreement between the principal and agent so
to terminate it.
Comment:
a. As authority originally conferred continues, unless
sooner terminated, in accordance with the original authorization, so authority may terminate at any time by agreement
of the parties either at the time of such agreement or subsequently.
b. A power in the form of an agency authority but held
for the benefit of a third person does not terminate by the
mutual consent of the donor and the holder (see § 139).
Annotation:
No Indiana cases have been found dealing with the subject matter of this
section.

Section 118. REVOCATION OR RENUNCIATION.
Authority terminates if the principal or the agent manifests to the other dissent to its continuance.

Comment:
a. Such termination by act of the principal is revocation;
by act of the agent, it is renunciation.
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b. Power to revoke or renounce. The principal has pow-

er to revoke and the agent has power to renounce, although
doing so is in violation of a contract between the parties
and although the authority is expressed to be irrevocable.
A statement in a contract that the authority cannot be terminated by either party is effective only to create liability
for its wrongful termination.
c. Liabilities. - Where there is a contract between principal and agent that the authority shall not be revoked or
renounced, a party who revokes or renounces, unless privileged by the conduct of the other or by supervening circumstances, is subject to liability to the other. The rules as to
the liabilities of the agent to the principal are stated in
§ 400; the liabilities of the principal to the agent, in §§ 450456.
d. Non-agency powers. A power in the form of an agency
authority given for the protection of a person described as
agent, but who is not one, is not an agency authority and
cannot be revoked by the power giver; if such a power is
held for the benefit of a third person, it can be terminated
neither by revocation nor renunciation (see § 139). Likewise, where a statute provides that a person is to be affected
by a notification given to another, designated an agent, the
power of the person so designated is not terminated by an
attempted revocation. In both of these cases, and in analogous situations, there is no agency as that word is used in the
Restatement of this Subject.

Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Honey
v. Guillaume, 172 Ind. 552, 88 N. E. 973 (1909); Goss v. Meadors, 78 Ind. 528
(1881); Pickler v. State, 18 Ind. 266 (1862); Pursley v. Morison, 7 Ind. 356,
63 Am. Dec. 424 (1855) ; Miller v. Miller, 4 Ind. App. 128, 30 N. E. 535 (1892).
A.power of attorney to confess judgment was, held irrevocable in Kindig v.
March, 15 Ind. 248 (1860).
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Section 119. MANNER OF REVOCATION OR RENUNCIATION.
Authority created in any manner terminates when either
party in any manner manifests to the other dissent to its continuance or, unless otherwise agreed, when the other has notice of dissent in accordance with the rules stated in §§ 9-11.

Comment:
a. Except where a statute so provides and irrespective of
whether or not the authority is under seal, the authority of
an agent is revoked or renounced by written or spoken words
or other conduct which, reasonably interpreted, indicates
that the principal no longer consents to have the agent act
for him or that the agent no longer consents so to act. An
agreement that the authority is to be revoked or renounced
only in a particular manner is ineffective; despite such an
agreement any form of manifestation made known to the
other party is effective.

b. Inconsistent conduct. The principal may manifest his
termination of consent by conduct which is inconsistent with
its continuance, as where he indicates that the agent is to do
an act different from that originally authorized, or where
he retakes possession of goods which he had authorized the
agent to sell, or where he sells or disposes of the subject matter or of his interest therein, or voluntarily causes its loss
or destruction. The inconsistent conduct may consist of authorizing another agent to act on his account; in such case,
it is a matter of interpretation whether the principal intends
to terminate the authority of the first agent or merely to
authorize another agent also to act. The agent may manifest
renunciation by conduct inconsistent with the continued performance of his duties to the principal.
*

*

*
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c. Time of termination. The revocation or renunciation
is effective when the principal or agent learns that the other
no longer consents to the continuance of the authority. Ordinarily, it is also effective when either party has reason to
know of it, in accordance with the rule stated in § 10, or
when a notification has been given, in accordance with the
rule stated in § 11. The parties may, however, agree that the
revocation or renunciation shall not occur until there is
knowledge of the withdrawal of consent, or they may specify
particular acts which will constitute notification.
Until the time when the manifestation is effective, it may
be withdrawn by a counter-manifestation; after such time
a manifestation of withdrawal of dissent operates as an offer to enter a new relationship on the terms of the old.

Annotation:
A revocation becomes operative so far as the agent is concerned from the
time the agent has actual notice thereof. Honey v. Guillaume, 172 Ind. 552, 88
N. E. 973 (1909) ; Miller v. Miller, 4 Ind. App. 128, 30 N. E. 535 (1892).
'TITLE C.

LOSS OF CAPACITY AND IMPOSSIBILITY

Section 120. DEATH oF PrNCipAL.
The death of the principal terminates the authority of the

agent.
Comment:
a. Upon the death of the principal, his former agent has
no authority to act for the principal's estate even though
the authority was given in contemplation of the principal's
death and although the parties contracted that his death
should not terminate it. It is only where a power, although
in the form of an agency power, is given for the benefit of
the agent or a third person that the power is not terminated
by the death of the one giving it (see § 139).
Caveat: No inference is to be drawn from the rule stated
in this Section that an agent does not have power to bind the
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estate of a deceased principal in'transactions dependent upon
a special relationship between the agent and the principal,
such as that of banker and depositor, or trustee and cestui
que trust, or in transactions in which special rules are applicable, as in dealings with negotiable instruments.
b. Notice. The authority of the agent terminates upon
the death of the principal although the agent has no means
of knowing that the principal has died at the time and although the agent is doing an act which, but for the principal's
death, he would be required by the agreement with the principal to perform. A contract, however, between the principal
and the agent by which the principal agrees that such conduct of the agent is not tortious with respect to the principal
and that -the agent is to be indemnified for any losses suffered by him in acting without authority, is enforceable (see
§ 386).
Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Supreme
Lodge Knights of Honor v. Jones, 35 Ind. App. 121, 69 N. E. 718 (1904) ; Johnson
v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182 (1865); Sawers Grain Co. v. Goodwine, 83 Ind. App. 556,
146 N. E. 837 (1925) ; Hawley v. Smith, 45 Ind. 183 (1873).
Section 121. DEATH OF AGENT.

The death of the agent terminates the authority.
Comment:
a. The rule stated in this Section is applicable to all agency
powers; a power held by a person as security either for himself or for another survives in his representatives (see § 139).
b. The rule stated in this Section has practical consequences where the agent has appointed a subagent. In this
case, as stated in § 137, the authority of the subagent to act
for the principal ceases upon the death of the agent, unless
the agreement with the principal is otherwise.
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c. If the agent has done an act which constitutes the exercise of his authority, the fact that he dies before the act
results in a contract or other transaction does not prevent
the act from being effective in creating relations between
the principal and the third person.

Annotation:
No Indiana cases dealing with death of agent as termination ofd simple agency
powers have been found. The rule as stated in this section is acinowledged by
implication in Todd v. Guffin, 55 Ind. App. 605, 104 N. E. 519 (1914).

Section 122. Loss

OF CAPACITY OF PRINCIPAL OR AGENT.

The authority of the agent to make the principal a party

to a transaction is terminated or suspended upon the happening of an event which deprives the principal of capacity to become a party to the transaction or deprives the agent of ca-

pacity to make the principal a party to it.

Comment:
a. The principal may cease to have capacity to make a
contract or to subject himself to liability because of mental
incompetency, as where there is a judicial determination of
his insanity, or because of other changes in condition which,
by the law of the State which controls the transaction, create
such incapacity. By becoming married, a woman, in some
States, loses her capacity to enter into certain transactions.
It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject
to state the rules relating to capacity.
b. Notice. The power of the agent terminates although
he has no notice of the principal's loss of capacity or of the
event causing it. It also terminates although the contingency
has been provided for and it has been agreed that the authority would not thereupon terminate.
c. Temporary incapacity. The rule stated in this Section applies to mental incompetency only when it creates
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legal incapacity, as it may do in case of mental disease.
Where the incapacity is only temporary, the authority of the
agent may be merely suspended. Where the principal becomes mentally incompetent for but a short period, as where
he has a delirium accompanying a fever, the agent's authority is not necessarily affected unless the transaction requires
communication between principal and agent during such
period or unless the illness creates a change in condition such
that the agent should realize that the principal would not
wish him to act (see § 108 (2)).

d. Illegality. The effect of a statute which prohibits a
transaction may be to make the performance of the transaction illegal but not inoperative. This is the normal operation of statutes requiring persons to be licensed. In such
cases, the rules stated in §§ 111, 115-116 are applicable. The
existence and extent of rights between the principal and the
agent depend upon the construction of the statute in question.
The outbreak of war between the country of the principal
and that of the agent ordinarily causes the parties to become alien enemies. In this event, as stated in § 115, war
may create such a change in conditions that the authority
is terminated because the agent should know that the principal no longer wishes him to act. If the authority is not thus
terminated, its execution by the agent may be illegal because
of the statutes relating to alien enemies. Such statutes may
have the effect of making the transactions by the agent inoperative, in which case the rule stated in this Section is applicable. Normally, however, the effect of such statutes is to
make the transactions by the agent criminal, such transactions having their normal effect with reference to innocent
third persons but creating only such limited rights between
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the principal and the agent as are created by the performance of other authorized but seriously criminal acts.

Annotation:
The rule stated in this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Chase v.
Chase, 163 Ind. 178, 71 N. E. 485 (1904).

Section 123. DEATH OR Loss oF CAPACITY OF JOINT PRINCIPALS OR
AGENTS.

The death or loss of capacity of one of two or more joint
principals terminates the authority of an agent to act on their
joint account. The death or loss of capacity of one of two

or more agents authorized to act only jointly terminates the
authority of the survivor.

Comment:
a. An agent who is employed to act for two or more principals, one of whom dies or loses capacity, is not authorized
to act for the estate of such person. If, therefore, he is authorized to act only on the joint account of all the principals,
his authority terminates. Likewise, the authority of two or
more agents which must be exercised by all of them terminates when one of them dies or loses capacity. Sections 120122 and the Comments thereon, stating the effect of the
death or loss of capacity of the principal or agent are applicable. Whether or not an agent is authorized to act only
on the joint account of two principals or whether or not two
agents are authorized to act jointly depends upon the manifestations of the principals. Section 41 states the inferences
which may be drawn. The effect of the death or loss of capacity of a member of a partnership employing agents or acting as agents is not within the scope of the Restatement of
this Subject.

b. An agent who has been authorized by two principals,
one of whom dies, continues to be authorized to act for the
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survivor if the authorization of the survivor so indicates.
Likewise, authority may be given to agents to act jointly
with a power in the survivor to exercise the authority. Where
several authorities are separately created by two or more
principals, notice of the death of one of them terminates authority to act for the other if, as the-agent should know, the
transaction is one in which the effect of the death is substantially to alter the contemplated transaction from the
point of view of the surviving principal (see § 108). Authority given to two or more agents to be exercised jointly or
severally is not terminated by the death of one of them.
**

*

Annotation:
The rule stated i n this section is in accord with the law of Indiana. Rowe v.
Rand, 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 377 (1887); Johnson v. Wilcox, 25 Ind. 182 (1865).

Section 124. IMPOSSIBILITY.
There is a termination of the agent's authority:
(a) to create interests in or otherwise deal with a particular subject matter, when it is destroyed;
(b) to affect the interests of the principal in a particular
subject matter, when the principal has lost his interests therein;
(c) to enter into transactions with particular persons when
they die or lose capacity to become parties to such
transactions; or
(d) to effectuate results when, by a change of law or other
conditions, the transactions which the agent is authorized to conduct do not effectuate such results.
Commenzt:
a. If a principal authorizes an agent to conduct a transaction which becomes impossible of performance, whether or
not the agent's privilege to attempt performance terminates
thereby, either at once or when he has notice thereof, depends upon the interpretation of the principal's manifestation. Although the agent's power to accomplish the trans-

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY

action is necessarily terminated in such cases, his privilege
to act, as between himself and the .principal, may survive.
Authority, however, as defined in the Restatement of this
Subject, includes the power of the agent as well as his privilege of acting, and hence there is a termination of his authority to accomplish results which have become impossible of
achievement. The authority necessarily terminates at once,
irrespective of whether the agent has reason to know or
should know of its termination. The principal, however, may
be subject to liability to. compensate the agent for efforts
made thereafter to execute the authority because it was
agreed that the risk of lack of knowledge should be upon the
principal or because the principal has failed in his duty to
notify the agent of the termination of authority (see § 435).
Also, in some cases, as stated in the following Comments, the
agent may have authority to bind the principal by a contract
which has become impossible of performance.
Comment on Clause (a):
b. Destruction of subject matter. Although authority to
deal specifically with the subject matter cannot be exercised
where it has been lost or destroyed, the agent may still continue to have authority to contract on behalf of the principal
with reference to it. This is true also where the agent has
been given authority to convey the interests of the principal
and the principal subsequently loses or transfers such interests. In both cases, whether or not the agent continues to
have authority to contract for the principal with respect
thereto depends upon the rules stated in § 110.

Comment on Clause (b):
c. Bankruptcy. Upon the bankruptcy of the principal,
the power of the agent to affect things which pass to the
trustee in bankruptcy terminates without notice to him. A
power held for security by one not an agent does not, how-
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ever, so terminate (see § 139), even though the right of possession to the subject matter may pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this
Subject to state what property passes to the trustee in bankruptcy or when it passes. As to property not involved in the
bankruptcy, the agent's authority is not terminated except
to the extent that notice of the change in the financial condition of the principal affects his authority, as stated in § 114.
The bankruptcy of the agent does not necessarily terminate his power to deal with the goods of the principal in his
possession, nor, in the absence of estoppel, do goods held in
his name for the benefit of the principal pass to the trustee
in bankruptcy. The effect of his bankruptcy upon his authority otherwise is stated in § 113.

Comment on Clause (d):
d. The rule stated in this Clause is applicable only if the
change in law or in conditions is such that the act directed
to be done is made inoperative or the result directed to be
achieved cannot be accomplished, as where the principal directs the agent to make a contract of a specified sort which
by statute cannot be made. A change in law which does not
have such an effect nevertheless may be one which terminates the agent's authority under the rule stated in § 116,
as where the directed transaction becomes illegal or, under
the changed legal conditions, against the interests of the
principal.

Annotation:
Dicta supporting the rules stated in the several divisions of this section are
found in Rowe v. Rand, 111 Ind. 206, 12 N. E. 337 (1887).

